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The contemporary international relations still include Russia as one of the key actors in the
Balkans politics. The relations between Russia and Yugoslavia were marked with an outright denounce-
ment of Slobodan Milosevic and his regime, which was also reflected in Russian s attitude toward NATO
intervention in Kosovo. However, Russian politics is not unanimous vis-a-vis Yugoslavia-on the one
hand it is still popular to use nationalist slogans for pre-electoral purposes and to uphold an aggressive
foreign policy, while on the other hand there is growing awareness that the political situation in Serbia
should be changed. The first meetings between Russian politicians and representatives of the Serbian
opposition marked the change in Russian policy toward Milosevic. Hence Russia has several options
first of which is to join forces with the international community. If it wishes to assert itself in Serbia,
Yugoslavia and the Balkans, Russia can only act as mediator, by taking part in peace activities in
consultation with other factors in the region.
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The Kosovo
1. Introduction
Due to historic circumstances and to numer-
ous contemporary political factors, Russia has been
- and remains - a key figure on the Balkan chess-
board. It is also true, though, that after the break-
down of the Soviet Union, the new Russia, heir of
the Russian Empire, has lost a considerable share of
its former power to influence the policies of the Bal-
kan states. As a result, these nations view Russia's
role from different positions. Most of our former
partners in the "socialist brotherhood" cooperate to-
day with NATO and the European Union. The present
leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
on the other hand, is forced to rely on Russia in the
hope of finding a counterbalance to US policies and
to NATO.
Playing the big powers, or military-political
alliances, against each other is a long tradition of
Belgrade. This strategy is also the result of the geo-
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political and strategic position of Serbia and thus of
Yugoslavia. Moreover, as things stand, provoking
conflicts between Russia and NATO is the only po-
litical option for survival left open to the former
President of the FRY and his regime. For its part,
Russia yielded to the stereotypes prevailing in a sec-
tion of its own society and helped the Milosevic re-
gime to stay afloat for a too long time. A crucial role
in all this was played by "personal" contacts and re-
lations between the Serbian and Russian political and
economic circles.
With very few exceptions, no Russian politi-
cian, even among the democratically-oriented ones,
came forward with an outright denouncement of
Slobodan Milosevic and his regime. This also ex-
plains the results of the vote in the UN Security Coun-
cil on 26 March 1999, when Russia proposed a reso-
lution demanding an end to the air strikes against
Yugoslavia and obtained only 3 out of 15 member
votes in support of this proposal. At the same time,
the Russian Duma, from LDPR to the "Apple", unani-
mously condemned NATO actions. The results of
public opinion research confirmed that a permanent
consensus exists in Russia opposing its involvement
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against the West and NATO. In other words, there is
a great discrepancy between the mood of the politi-
cal structures and the mood of the population.
In view of this situation, the extremely nega-
tive results of Russian policy during the conflict in
Kosovo were only to be expected. At first, the West
did not include Russia in its deliberations, both be-
cause of their evidently conflicting interests and be-
cause the support given by Russian politicians to the
venture of S. Milosevic was unacceptable as an al-
ternative to military action. Inevitably, regardless of
President Yeltsin's public statements ("We shall not
give up Kosovo without resistance!"), air raids
against Yugoslavia were launched in March 1999.
The strikes were continued regardless of Moscow's
official condemnation of "NATO aggression" and
similar statements. According to Russian political
scientist and Member of the Duma A. Arbatov, fol-
lowing on an unprecedented explosion of anti-Ameri-
can feelings, debates in Russia went so far as to sug-
gest sending arms to Yugoslavia, as the victim of
aggression. This, of course, would have implied a
military confrontation with NATO, or using all avail-
able political means to pressure the West. However,
everybody in Moscow gradually realised that a pro-
tracted dispute with the West (even if only for "in-
ternal use") would act against Russia's long-term
interests.
There is an ongoing argument between two
factions in Russia today, not only over the policy
towards Yugoslavia but over foreign policy in gen-
eral. There is a struggle being fought over the choice
of the road to be taken after the year 2000. On the
one side, it is still popular to use nationalist slogans
for pre-electoral purposes and to uphold an aggres-
sive foreign policy; there is still furtive talk about
"protecting the Orthodox Serb brothers". On the
other side, though, there is growing awareness that
the situation in Serbia should be reversed, that Rus-
sia needs another policy, since the present one is
obviously at an impasse. Soon after the termination
of NATO military operations, the "Kosovo problem"
and the "Serb national question" ceased to be used
explicitly to manipulate Russian public opinion.
2. Russian realpolitik
The declared Russian realpolitik, that is, the
geopolitical direction chosen by this great state, has
failed the test, in the opinion of D. Trenin, Deputy
Director of the Carnegie Centre in Moscow. This
realpolitik is, namely, at odds with the policies that
the Russian leadership is forced to implement. And
this contrast is very much in evidence in everyday
practice. On the one hand, military instructions were
issued in the country concerning the "Yugoslav situ-
ation", in other words, a counterstroke against NATO
was contemplated. Some political analysts declared
that, in the end, Russia did not derive any profit from
its confrontation with NATO, but, in spite of this,
they are fascinated by the revival of the so-called
"defence awareness" in Russia and are demanding a
revision of the Helsinki accords on Kosovo. A mili-
tary doctrine is being formulated whereby NATO is
no longer regarded as a partner.
At the same time, though, in planning the op-
eration in Chechnya in autumn 1999, the Russian
military leadership was obviously inspired by the
operation launched by NATO against Yugoslavia. On
the other hand, first moves have been made by Rus-
sia to re-establish contacts with NATO. The activi-
ties of the Russia-NATO Consultative Council have
been renewed, and General V. Zavarzin has returned
to Brussels, even though he stated that his return did
not signify the renewal of full-scale cooperation and
that he had returned only because of the beginning
of the operation in Kosovo. Russian Foreign Affairs
Minister I. Ivanov is of the opinion that this has
"served as an instance of new thinking about Euro-
pean security, a new view on the Russia-NATO rela-
tionship. Due to the activities of the North Atlantic
Alliance on the Balkans, all of this has become even
more evident".
Developments on Yugoslavia's domestic scene
have placed Russia before a difficult choice of whose
side to take: to side with the opposition, which was
weak at that time and critical towards Russia because
of its support to Milosevic, or to continue endorsing
Milosevic, who was in power, while formally pro-
claiming the principle of non- interference in the in-
ternal affairs of others?
By supporting Milosevic, Russia ran the risk
not only of damaging its relationship with the West
but also of finding itself in complete isolation in the
Balkans. An alliance of this kind would be likely to
disturb the fragile balance of forces, interests and
inter-ethnic relations in Russia itself. The disruption
of this balance could produce disastrous conse-
quences for Russia itself.
On 30 July 1999, at the conference in Sarajevo
convened for the signing of the Stability Pact for
Milosevic but also met V. Seselj, which definitely
helped to improve his political image. The delega-
tion did not meet representatives of the Albanians in
Kosovo.
By the same token, the first meetings of Rus-
sian diplomats with the representatives of Serbian
opposition may be regarded as a new accent in our
policies. The contacts, which are long overdue, are
the result of Moscow's efforts to devise a more flex-
ible and pragmatic line, a line that was initiated by
the visit of M. Dukanovic. The vast majority of po-
litical activists in Russia, who uphold the legacy of
"love for the Slav peoples" and support their "Or-
thodox brethren", and thus do an immense service
to Milosevic, have no idea of the actual situation in
individual countries and in the region as a whole.
The fate of these peoples is of little interest to them.
Moscow looks upon these as it did in the old times:
as a mere instrument of its rivalry with the West,
and views the region as the object of struggle for
domination.
Furthermore, domestic politicians are increas-
ingly demonstrating their complete lack of under-
standing of the nature of national movements and of
the break-up of the SFRY. For example, in justly
pointing out Milosevic's responsibility for the dis-
solution of the SFRY, V.S. Chernomyrdin said that
he had quarrelled with all regions (underlined S.R.);
that he could not ensure the peaceful coexistence of
Serbs and Moslems, which then led to war. Even now,
Montenegro is referred to in Russia at best as an au-
tonomous territory within Serbia, not as an equal and
constituent republic of FRY, entitled to leave the fed-
eral state. In our country, both the former and the
present Yugoslavia are considered a Serb state, de-
stroyed by "bad guys", mostly nationalists from those
nations which seceded from the SFRY.
Even today, many writings are found in our
newspapers, stemming exclusively from Serb
sources, which claim that Montenegrins are in fact
Serbs, both by language and by religion, calling
Montenegro an "Orthodox Republic". The authors
do not mention, or do not know, that Montenegro
was an independent state from 1878 to 1918 and that
it had lost its independence by entering into the King-
dom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (becoming Yu-
goslavia in 1929).
It is also true that there are quite a few people
in Moscow who do not understand, or arrogantly
refuse to acknowledge, that the wish of post- Yugo-
slav states to join NATO and the European Union,
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South-Eastern Europe, the then Russian Prime Min-
ister S. Stepashin distanced himself from the poli-
cies practised by S. Milosevic. He declared that the
"suffering of the Yugoslav people was not only
caused by the bombing but also by the regime of S.
Milosevic". His words were in perfect harmony with
those of B. Yeltsin, who spoke about the "pressing
need to settle the Yugoslav situation and to establish
friendly relations with the USA, Germany, France
and other states".
The visit by the Montenegrin President M.
Dukanovic in August 1999 was taken by many ana-
lysts as a sign of Russian reorientation to Yugoslav
democrats and a dismissal of "doubtful characters,
obtained as part of the legacy of the Soviet empire".
The beginning of contacts with the Yugoslav and
Serbian opposition and the quest for alternative poli-
cies is without doubt a step in the right direction, but
it must be also borne in mind that the people
Dukanovic met in Moscow were often the same per-
sons who called for a union between Russia, Belarus
and Yugoslavia. The reaction by the Montenegrin
President to this proposal is well known: he declared
that Montenegro would leave Yugoslavia should
these plans materialise. Domestic politicians ought
to admit to themselves that they cannot maintain
contacts with both the Serb and the general Yugo-
slav opposition based on "Slav-Orthodox brother-
hood" at the same time, and that they must give up
the fantasy of Russian access to the Adriatic Sea.
3. Jointly warning
about Montenegro
Even the staunch advocate of close ties with
Serbia Luzhkov considered it necessary to point out
in an article published in August 1999 that
"Milosevic is responsible for the purges in Kosovo.
The attempt to suppress Montenegro demonstrates
the resolve of the authorities to use all available
means in order to stay in power. Clearly, Russia and
the European Union should jointly send out a warn-
ing that military force against Montenegro would not
be tolerated. Should this nevertheless happen, joint
action against such a policy of Belgrade would be
indicated". This ambiguity and inconsistency on the
part of Moscow was again manifested at the time a
Russian delegation, headed by Deputy Foreign Min-
ister A. Avdeev, visited Belgrade early in September
1999. The members did not only have talks with S.
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and thus to become equal partners in European inte-
gration processes, does not pose any threat to Rus-
sia. These strivings are the result of historical devel-
opment and of a long-term policy in keeping with
their national interests, not a passing whim of this or
that political elite. It is a choice imposed by com-
plex inter-ethnic and inter-state relationships in the
region. In the countries of the region, irrespective of
occasional rumblings brought about by pressures
from the US or the European Union to accelerate the
pace of their democratisation, most of their
populations will endorse the line taken by their lead-
erships, due to regional relations and lacking an al-
ternative development model. Peoples and states,
tired of wars, want to have a security system that
will guarantee the inviolability of present borders.
As things stand today, Russia cannot offer either the
material means or a transition model, or an alterna-
tive option for the regulation of international rela-
tions, or a security system. On the contrary, Russia
is not only unable to guarantee stability and security
but is itself turning into a factor of instability. The
position of Russia can be strengthened only if it be-
comes economically viable, if it continues moving
in the direction of democracy and the free market,
and if it renounces pan-Slavistic tendencies and
Stalinist rhetoric.
A considerable number of domestic analysts
and specialists have drawn the oversimplified and
wrong conclusion that Russia's foreign policy can
only be either anti- West (i.e. patriotic and independ-
ent) or pro- West (i.e. antipatriotic and non-independ-
ent). The consequence of such reasoning is that Rus-
sia is forced to apply a second-class policy towards
the countries of Western Europe and the USA, a
policy which is reduced to merely reacting to their
initiatives. This is also clear to the post-Yugoslav
republics. During his visit to Moscow, the President
of Montenegro observed the evident willingness of
Russia to renounce its past: "Russia is a great state,
and should formulate its own policies, policies mo-
tivated by its own interests rather than in opposition
to US policies".
This opposition stems from the phobias and
myths of the past (partly from Russia's mythical
"legacy" to act as Serbia's protector), not from the
realities of the present times. As a result, the inter-
ests of Russia are identified with the interests of the
current rightist regime in Serbia, while the events in
Kosovo are incorrectly and wrongly compared to the
events in Chechnya.
The latest developments in Russia itself seem
to have driven the Balkan problems to the back-
ground, but they can still have an impact on foreign
policy.
The first of the possible foreign policy options
in this regard would be to join forces with the inter-
national community, above all with the countries of
Western Europe and the USA, in combating nation-
alism and terrorism, primarily of the Moslem type.
In theory, this variant does not preclude an attempt
to bring about a reconciliation between the West and
Slobodan Milosevic, the "fighter against Moslem
terrorism" in Bosnia and Kosovo.
Another option open to Russian policy-mak-
ers is self-isolation and fight against the "Moslem"
world and the West in alliance with the "Orthodox
world" - Belarus and Serbia. The adoption of this
variant could be sustained by the false identification
of Kosovo and Chechnya, which is by now firmly
rooted in the minds of a substantial part of politi-
cians and politically active citizens. The Russo-
Chechen conflict of 1995-1998 did not develop into
an inter-ethnic conflict, although the Chechens do
have aspirations for national self-determination and
statehood. The conflict was more of an economic,
political and strategic character, even though the
Chechens, just like the Albanians in Kosovo, insist
on their "historic inequality". Conditions for a trans-
formation into an inter-ethnic conflict began to form
in the autumn of 1999.
4. Kosovo as
the "Serb Chechnya"?
A considerable number of Russians consider
Kosovo as the "Serb Chechnya" and view the suc-
cesses of the Serb side as "our" victory over "Mos-
lems" and "separatists". Regarded from a purely le-
gal point of view, as an issue of preserving the integ-
rity and the borders of a multi-ethnic state and as a
problem of ensuring minority rights, such a compari-
son could be valid. The position of Russia, which
officially endorses the principle of non-interference
in the internal affairs of Serbia, is focused at the
moment precisely on the substance of this formal
legal analogy. The "Kosovo case" need not neces-
sarily become a precedent to be followed by other
nations and states in Europe, including Russia, al-
though it will be doubtlessly invoked on future oc-
casions. There are also other instances of settling
JA UARY - JUNE 2000 15
similar problems, regardless of differences in inter-
preting various international documents dealing with
the right to self-determination, minority rights and
the like, which go both in favour of central govern-
ment as well as in favour of national movements and
ethno-territorial formations within multi-ethnic
states.
"Many separatist forces in different parts of
Europe can hardly wait to see Kosovo leave Yugo-
slavia and to form a mono-ethnic Community", con-
siders I. Ivanov. "In that case it will be extremely
difficult to halt such processes, in the Balkans and
in Europe at large. Unfortunately, we are already
beginning to feel the crunch."
There are major and substantive differences,
however, even from a formal-legal standpoint, which
do not permit equalising the situations in Kosovo
and Chechnya. Moreover, references to historic par-
allels and legal precedents as universally valid and
effective in approaching "national questions" do not
lead anywhere. Each national question has its own
unique characteristics. The issue of the preservation,
or dissolution, of a multi-ethnic and federal state
primarily depends on its internal viability. Equalis-
ing the situation in Kosovo with that in Chechnya,
which seems to have had a hypnotic effect on some
segments of Russian diplomacy, only serves to
weaken Russia's position. If "Kosovo has been and
still is regarded as the cradle of Serb civilisation",
the same cannot be said of Chechnya in relation to
the Russians. This, in turn, means that a powerful,
myth-based, motivating factor is lacking in the latter
case. In the popular psychology and historical
memory of Russians, Chechnya does not occupy the
place Kosovo does for the Serbs - even granted that
it is just a question of mythology and stereotypes.
The Chechens are a compact community, their eth-
nic territory is not divided into several neighbouring
states. The Albanian question, on the other hand, is
historically an inter-state and international issue,
since the Albanians do not only live in Serbia and
Montenegro, which constitute the FRY, and in Mac-
edonia, where they represent a large national minor-
ity, but also in their independent national state, Al-
bania.
Unlike Kosovo, the issue in Chechnya is not
the self-determination of two small peoples (as are
the Serbs and the Albanians) who inhabited the same
territory at different historical periods. Chechnya has
never been independent within the frame of the So-
viet Union (as were Kosovo and Metohia). However,
what Kosovo and Chechnya have in common is the
problem of preserving the territorial integrity of new
states, created during the break-up of multi-national
socialist states, and setting external boundaries.
And lastly: despite certain correspondences,
is it justified to lump together President Yeltsin and
S. Milosevic, as well as their policies?
For some time, Russian foreign policy has
been subject to the current ratio of political forces in
the country. There is no consensus on two funda-
mental issues: should Russia take part in the peace-
keeping operations in Kosovo, and should it partici-
pate in the economic reconstruction of Serbia,
Montenegro and Kosovo? The "patriots" say firmly
that it should, regarding the peace-keeping opera-
tion as a new form of "Russian opposition to the
West", and Kosovo as its first line. Many democrats,
on the other hand, advocate an isolationist policy and
say that it should not. "The fateful fantasies of Rus-
sian Slav-lovers are coming true: dressing in armour,
meddling in the affairs of strangers, giving offence
to everybody, uniting Gogol and Mesa Selirnovic,
the sun and the crescent, Lukasenko and Milosevic,
dipping their boots in the Adriatic Sea, and finally,
stopping at a Slav airport and having lunch with the
British" - so wrote ironically V. Novodvorskaya in
June 1999.
But, in the actual complex situation, neither
of them are right. The problem lies in the fact that
Russian policies can represent both a stabilising and
a destabilising factor, in Yugoslavia as well as eve-
rywhere else, including Russia herself. There can be
no doubt: Russia should have participated in the
peace operations, but in a completely different way
and with different aims. The legal expert G. Kunadze
wrote in the "Novoe Vremya" that the "leap on
Pristina" was a dangerous move, and could have
caused irreparable damage in the case of a conflict
between the Russian and NATO peace-keepers. Fur-
thennore, had that "leap" proceeded as planned, even
though this might sound incredible and even ridicu-
lous, the union of Russia, Belarus and Yugoslavia
would have become reality overnight. (In one of his
recent interviews, the Yugoslav Ambassador to Mos-
cow B. Milosevic stated that this idea has still not
lost its topicality.) This would mean the reinstate-
ment of bloc divisions and the erection of a new wall
- this time in Pristina.
The popularity of Russian foreign policy is
certainly not enhanced by the interview given by G.
Seleznev to the daily "Jutarnji list", in which he
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claims that access to the Adriatic Sea is an impera-
tive for Russia and that the alliance between Russia
and Belarus ought to be extended to cover Yugosla-
via, with President S. Milosevic at its head. Need-
less to say, statements of this kind find an extremely
negative reception in political and social circles. By
such ill-considered and aggressive statements, which
ignore the current political and psychological facts
in the post-Yugoslav space, Moscow not only fails
to strengthen its influence in the region but increas-
ingly weakens it.
The idea of creating a political alliance be-
tween Russia, Belarus and Yugoslavia, and thereby
establishing strategic positions in the Balkans and
the Adriatic can only be assessed as a primitive
provocation, which, if realised, would only serve to
weaken the position of Russia in Serbia, or Yugosla-
via, and in the Balkans as a whole. Although today,
in Russia or in the West, practically nobody takes
seriously the prospect of such an alliance, politicians
ought to be aware of the impact of merely mention-
ing plans of this kind. Moreover, similar calculations
have proved unfounded in the past, to put it mildly.
It is quite evident that neither Russia nor Serbia
would profit by peace operations conducted by our
soldiers on behalf of our "Serb Orthodox brothers"
with the aim of buttressing the regime of S.
Milosevic, who never was, and never will be, an ally
of Russia. Furthermore, a large part of the Serbian
population are disgruntled with the ten-year rule of
S. Milosevic and would turn against Russia.
This problem can be also viewed from another
angle. Russian isolationism, be it of the imperial or
democratic type, and possible non-participation in
peace-keeping forces would definitely serve to bol-
ster the Milosevic regime. Such a move would lead
to another defeat of the reformist forces, not only in
foreign but also in domestic policies. Withdrawing
the Russian peace-makers would not make much
sense, and would be as risky as the famous "leap to
the south". On the other hand, though, this would be
a logical sequel in the series of disastrous and short-
sighted episodes of Russian policy. Moscow proved
to be unprepared when events did not develop ac-
cording to its scenario, and, as usual, NATO ignores
Russia's objections, especially those it declares to
be "imperial ambitions".
5. Normalisation
of relations with NATO
It is absolutely crucial that Russia should nor-
malise its relations with NATO. To begin with, this
is in the interest of Russia, which has become entan-
gled in the establishment of a tripartite alliance be-
tween Russia, Belarus and Yugoslavia, that is, with
countries which are no longer able, or willing, to act
as strategic partners in the games for which Russia
is, anyway, no longer strong enough. Against this
background, it is difficult to evaluate Russian par-
ticipation in joint peace operations. True, our par-
ticipation would have a high cost, only this price
would not be paid for false prestige but rather for
our peaceful and civilised future. In Kosovo, like in
Bosnia, those who serve as soldiers must receive
adequate remuneration, because a weakened army
can change from a force protecting the society into
one that threatens it.
It is also essential that Russia participate in
Yugoslavia's reconstruction, first of all, because this
is the more important, even the overriding, aspect of
the peace operation, whose purpose is not parading
and flag waving. The only question is: what to re-
construct, and for whom? Reconstructing facilities
so as to provide the minimum of comfort and shelter
for the population is one thing. Reconstructing fa-
cilities that are used by the military or serve as a
propaganda tool for the regime is another matter.
Russia's participation in such projects would be quite
unacceptable, again, primarily in her own best inter-
ests. The reconstruction of facilities for peaceful
purposes, such as bridges and power plants, would
create new jobs, not only for the Albanians, Serbs
and Montenegrins but also for Russians, and all of it
together would help to normalise life in Yugoslavia.
Joint economic activities with other countries, even
with competitors, is much better than voluntary iso-
lation within the confines of the "sector" in Kosovo,
which might turn into the scene of new controver-
sies and from which Russia might have to depart soon
at the request of the Serb side. These are the rea-
sons why the West would be making a great mistake
ifit excluded Russia from peace-keeping operations
in Yugoslavia. The absence of Russia would not only
lead to its isolation but would motivate its politi-
cians to establish closer ties with Milosevic. This,
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however, would represent a violation of international
conventions. Economic activity is a realistic alter-
native to military games. Russian help to Yugosla-
via in establishing peace would be a realistic option
to a policy which has already become anti-Russian
in some military circles. In recruiting volunteers,
some Serb generals have already declared that Rus-
sia is to blame for Serbia's defeat. This is just an-
other instance of the Milosevic propaganda, which
always tries to shift onto others the blame for its fail-
ures. Serb nationalists attribute their defeat to Rus-
sia, who was supposed, in the name of some mythi-
cal debt, to sacrifice not only her interests but also
the lives of its citizens, and to enter into war, like
1914, only this time against NATO. The alleged re-
sponsibility of Russia for Serbia's defeat is an obvi-
ous example of the propaganda practised by Serb
nationalists, who always look outside for scapegoats
for their misdeeds. This type of propaganda has be-
come an equally large threat to freedom and democ-
racy as the "alliance" of Moscow, Minsk and Bel-
grade.
Serb analysts (lately also joined by politicians)
of liberal orientation consider this situation abso-
lutely intolerable. In their opinion, in the present day
and age, the relationship of Russia and the West can
only be that of partners, not enemies. Hostile propa-
ganda against Russia has become an obstacle on the
road to freedom and democracy, no less than the
propaganda based on the ethnic kinship of the two
peoples and on the idea of their alliance. Russian
isolationism and refusal to participate in the peace-
keeping military and economic activities conducted
by the international community would actually only
help to bolster the current regime. It would be an-
other defeat for the forces of realism in foreign as
well as domestic policy.
In the future, no government in Serbia is likely
to want a unilateral and long-term alliance with Rus-
sia. Serbia does not need a strong Russia in the Bal-
kans, but Russia does need a strong Serbia. This is
the result of the geopolitical position of the two states
and of their inevitably common interests in the re-
gion. The Russian leadership regards Yugoslavia as
the strategic centre of the Balkan Peninsula, so that
the interests of Belgrade and of Moscow inevitably
coincide. For this reason, once Yugoslavia overcomes
the current crisis, it is more than likely that their re-
lations will cool down. In the case of radical forces
taking power both in Russia and in Serbia, a dispute
resembling the Stalin- Tito conflict is a distinct pos-
sibility. Besides, the first task of the governments of
Serbia and Yugoslavia will be to rehabilitate the
economy, devastated not only by the bombardment
but also by the long years of Milosevic's policy. For
this, it will be necessary to turn for help to the Euro-
pean Union and to the USA.
In the eyes of Serbian opposition, Moscow has
diminished its standing by ignoring the interests of
the democratic opposition in Serbia and by uphold-
ing the Milosevic regime, and also due to its irre-
sponsible policy in Kosovo. For its part, Russia
would find in Serbia, or Yugoslavia, with Milosevic
or with another radical nationalist politician (and
others are nowhere in sight for the moment) at its
head, only a poor ally, whose geopolitical position
and national interest would result in a constant ten-
dency to seek ties with the West, regardless of eve-
rything. Yugoslavia does not need Russia for this,
what is more, it is a competitor in the contest for
loans. Moscow cannot give Serbia either money or
the technology wherewith to reconstruct its economy,
devastated by nationalists and socialists, and crime-
ridden as the result of international sanctions. As long
as the current FRY President and his followers re-
main in power, they will try to shift on Russia the
blame for all their failures and mistakes, and this
would definitely not be conducive to better relations
between them.
According to the results of a survey carried
out in Serbia in October 1999, less than 10% respond-
ents opted for an alliance with Russia, while almost
60% of them supported cooperation with EU coun-
tries.
Serb intellectuals are unanimous in their opin-
ion that Milosevic should resign, but they differ on
the issue of the abolition of sanctions and economic
assistance. The leader of the "Alliance for Change",
Z. Dzindzic publicly endorses such assistance, see-
ing in this also support for a part of the opposition.
The well-known publicist Milorad Pavic comments
this in the following manner: "If Russia or anybody
else helps, they will not be helping Serbia or Yugo-
slavia but only S. Milosevic."
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Official Belgrade has not adopted any defi-
nite stand on the events in Chechnya, but these events
did not pass without any comparisons. Belgrade was
inclined to compare the conduct of military opera-
tions in Kosovo and in Chechnya. The liberal weekly
"Vreme" writes that in its strategy and its tactics the
Kremlin fully imitated NATO's operation against
Yugoslavia. Tending to the traditional Yugoslav
world view and balancing between the "great pow-
ers", the weekly "Nin" concludes in an editorial that
Russia did not support Serbia because it had to fin-
ish the "job" in Chechnya. That is why the Kremlin
failed to speak up against the NATO action in
Kosovo, and why NATO does not declare its views
on the operation in the Caucasus. The Kremlin and
the US are collaborating, claims the weekly, and con-
cludes: "Big nations can act in accordance with their
interests, while small nations, the Serbs among them,
had better not count on false friends as long as the
present ratio of forces prevails."
It may sound paradoxical but it is true: the
operation in Chechnya might thus undermine Rus-
sia's position in the Balkans, even in Serbia itself.
After the end of the military conflict, Russia should
define its relationship with the Belgrade authorities
in a broader sense. By maintaining relations with the
Russian left radicals and by not distancing itselffrom
them, in a certain sense Russia bears the responsi-
bility for the Kosovo crisis. And even if this did not
make matters worse, this circumstance has not per-
mitted the improvement of relations with neighbour-
ing Slav countries, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and even with
Montenegro, the second constituent republic of the
FRY. Montenegro is increasingly opposing
Milosevic's policies, and is balancing between the
prospect of the overthrow of the present leadership,
headed by M. Dukanovic, and secession from the
FRY. Relations with the Albanian side are difficult,
if not impossible, to envisage. In a long-term per-
spective, Russia would benefit by stability on the
Balkans, and this is why its strategic task is to estab-
lish normal relations with the Balkan states, and the
settlement of existing differences and disputes in al-
liance with these countries. To be able to perform
this role, Russia must adopt a neutral and non-parti-
san stance, not only in relation to the Albanian-Serb
conflict but also with respect to the Milosevic re-
gime, to the post-Yugoslav countries and also to
NATO. The main interest of Russia in the Balkans is
not to support President Milosevic and his fellow-
nationalists but to work towards the normalisation
of relations and the implementation of the fundamen-
tal guidelines set by the international community.
If it wishes to assert itself in Serbia, Yugosla-
via and the Balkans, Russia can only act as media-
tor, by taking part in peace activities in consultation
with other factors in the region. This is the only fea-
sible role it can play, as an alternative to confronta-
tion with NATO. This position is examined by some
of the leading political scientists. "National in-
terests should be compatible with those in each cen-
tre of power with whom Russia wishes to cooperate
in the 21st century on a partnership basis, and to-
wards this end talks should be carried on with a maxi-
mum of care and patience. In that case, nobody will
be able to point the finger at Russia and claim that it
had pushed the world into another cold war," in the
words of the Director of the Centre for Strategic Stud-
ies A. Piontkovski, uttered in 1997.
"In the long run, it is crucial for Russia to re-
tain a sense of reality. It should cultivate a realistic
approach in foreign politics. Equally important is that
this realism should not turn into hostility towards
everything Western, as this would lead the country
into isolationism and autarchy", is the opinion of I.
Kobrinskaya, Director of the East-West Institute in
Moscow.
6. Conclusion
On the basis of the conclusions inevitably
drawn from the Yugoslav crisis, the most essential is
to realise all the dangers for Russia which could arise
should it become isolated from the outside world.
Serb nationalism, playing on the weak points of the
Russian political class, is not the first and only one
to try and push Russia to the brink of a precipice.
The defence against falling into it is cooperation with
democratic forces, the quest for dialogue with Euro-
pean structures and the rule of international law.
However, as long as Russia is trying, albeit
unconsciously, to save the Milosevic regime, it is
doomed to failure. For successful mediation in the
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present, not too simple, situation, Russian politicians
must break the vicious circle. This circle is closed,
on the one side, by the adverse effects of the Yugo-
slav crisis on the domestic scene in Russia, and on
the other by the circumstance that foreign policy is
the hostage of domestic policy. It is imperative, there-
fore, to strengthen relations with the USA and with
the countries of Western Europe - so as to prevent
Milosevic from playing on the differences between
these states and involving Russia into risky under-
takings on the basis of the contacts he had with Rus-
sian left radical politicians. If such ploys can be pre-
vented, Milosevic will be deprived of his internal
political base and of room for foreign-policy manoeu-
vring. At the same time, it should be borne in mind
that, as was confirmed in practice, sanctions and iso-
lation have failed to weaken Milosevic's regime and
to transfer power to his opponents. A sudden decline,
or even break-up, of the FRY in any form would not
bring peace to the Balkans but rather even greater
destabilisation in the region and the revival of inter-
ethnic and inter-state conflicts.
Both political scientists and publicists agree
that events relevant to the settlement of the situation
in Serbia could occur next spring. This expectation,
however, implies danger for the opposition, as a more
or less organised force, and thereby also for democ-
racy in Serbia. The opposition runs the danger of
losing the support of its followers, disillusioned by
its poor performance so far. This, in turn, might bring
to the fore much darker forces than those represented
by Milosevic and his supporters. The Western Euro-
pean countries would try and prevent such a course
of events, probably by intervention outside the bor-
ders of the FRY, above all with respect to the reha-
bilitation of the electric power grid and the recon-
struction of power plants.
It is becoming increasingly evident that the
peace-making action has not been able to establish
peace between the nations in conflict and to create a
political civil society in Kosovo. The policy of eth-
nic cleansing has resulted in the shrinking of the Serb
population in favour of the Albanians, even though
it would be wrong to compare the policy of Belgrade
with the policy of the Kosovo Liberation Army. The
future status ofKosovo within Serbia is likewise still
undefined. Granting it the status of a third constitu-
ent republic in the FRY, or autonomy under interna-
tional protectorate - finally to merge with Albania,
would threaten regional stability and substantively
undermine European stability in general.
The West considers the agreement between
NATO and the KLA of 20 September 1999 a major
step on the road to peace in Kosovo. Moscow, ac-
cording to statements by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, has adopted a completely contrary position.
Although any further deterioration of relations would
not serve either Brussels or Moscow, more and more
reference is being made lately to April 1999, when
NATO began its attacks on the FRY. If both parties
fail to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution, they
might have to pay a high price.
The impression is created that, as things stand
today, both air raids and peace operations have lost
much of their justification. Not only have they bol-
stered S. Milosevic and Serb nationalism but have
had the same effect on Albanian nationalism. Para-
doxically, interference by other states for the pur-
pose of protecting multi-ethnicity, creating a civil
society and defending human and minority rights has
resulted in the creation of a mono-ethnic totalitarian
state within new boundaries, adding new ethnic con-
flicts to the old ones. Russia could again decide to
stand behind S. Milosevic and his regime, while the
West seems to have accepted the new Albanian leader
A. Taqi. It is quite clear that neither of the two can
be classed among advocates of a democratic civil
society. Likewise, they cannot figure as protagonists
of a "democratic multi-ethnic Kosovo" and cannot
be expected to renounce their ideas about changing
boundaries.
It hardly bears thinking what stance an ethni-
cally pure Albanian Kosovo would adopt towards
Yugoslavia and Serbia, regardless of UN Resolution
No. 1244 and the statement by NATO Secretary-
General J. Solana, who said that the Albanians should
be placated by an interim status and by leaving them
the hope of independence. Moreover, a NATO-sup-
ported recognition of changed boundaries could re-
sult in further destabilisation of the situation in the
Balkans and in Europe at large and put a question
mark over all the boundaries established after the
Second World War. •
